This book is informative for people new to philosophy of the mind. Nevertheless, I noted a certain bias on the part of the author against physicalism in general. Furthermore, it seems that in certain places he misconstrues certain concepts and makes contradictory statements. For instance, he claims that functionalism is consistent with type-type identity theory; yet, how can this be since type-type identity theory posits that certain types of mental states are identical with certain types of physical states while functionalism essentially denies that this is so since, from the functionalist perspective it is theoretically possible for a mental state A to be caused by both physical state B and C based upon the supposition that these different physical states are functional equivalents? Furthermore, in his discussion of the objections to substance dualism he (perhaps I did not understand his position correctly on this issue) misconstrues the argument that questions the ability of a non-physical mind to cause a physical effect by suggesting that this argument is really nothing more than an assumption that "causation must always be local." It seems to me that the issue is not whether causation must be "local" but rather whether a non-physical something can causally affect the physical world. At any rate, the book is informative though at times confusing and perhaps even a bit misleading. Nevertheless, I would still recommend it as it flows well in most places and is an enjoyable read.