"Natural Moralities," though interesting as an extended work endorsing moral relativism, was incredibly laborious and time-consuming to read. In itself, this need not detract from the quality of a work. Its difficulty, however, arose not from a concentration of detailed philosophical argument, but from awkward, indirect language. The central challenge was not trying to grasp Wong's arguments, but to uncover them. Consider the following passage:



"The more specific naturalistic themes endorsed here are not substantive, ontological views, but are rather methodological in character. One such methodological theme holds that philosophy should not employ a distinctive, a priori method for yielding substantive truths shielded from empirical testing. Another such theme holds that there is no sharp boundary between epistemology and the science of psychology."



Typical of his circumspect style, Wong does not directly claim anything here. First, by using the passive voice, he distances his authorial voice from any position presented through it: ("The... themes endorsed here are methodological in character.") Second, he presents his position not as a statement or argument, but in terms of "themes". And how might these appear if translated into more direct language?



"Philosophy should not (or cannot) make theoretical claims that cannot be empirically verified or corroborated. Because of this, epistemology (the theoretical investigation of knowledge and its justification) and psychology (the empirical study of the human brain and human behavior) are not divisible into separable fields of inquiry as traditionally thought."



To simplify the first of these claims even further:



"Facts and principles can only be derived from the empirical sciences; that is, the only facts and principles that exist are empirically demonstrable."



This claim appears self-undermining: no empirical evidence can support it because it is not an empirical claim--it is a claim about claims. Calling it a methodological assumption does not seem to excuse this contradictoriness. Wong later writes that "methodological naturalism does not rule out the use of nonempirical methods, but rather insists that the deliverances of such methods cannot be taken as self-evident or permanent." This claim, however, seems equally self-undermining: it is itself nonempirical, and by "insisting" that nonempirical conclusions cannot be self-evident or permanent, Wong makes a permanent claim that appears to be justifiable on no other grounds than its self-evidence.



There are some redeeming aspects to this volume. Wong views ethics as an evolutionary development, one that enabled humans to flourish according to the needs of different environments. Situating ethics in this way--as originally developing within a natural framework--seems inevitable for anyone who rejects simplified biblical creationism. Wong then concludes there is no single true morality, but that many moralities fall within the limits of an adequate morality as defined by needs of communities according to human nature. This conclusion seems invalid: humans are not at the mercy of their environments as are other creatures; they can significantly alter their surroundings to better promote communal flourishing. Once this is accounted for, analyzing morality involves judging which societies have best adjusted to and altered their environments in accordance with human nature. The measure of a morality is not how well it promotes flourishing within a specific environment, but how well it promotes human flourishing as such. The constraints of human nature must seemingly yield a determinate, consistent moral content. Different environments will undoubtedly cause differences in the ways flourishing is promoted (e.g. we drive on the left side of the road, while other countries drive on the right), but these are morally irrelevant disparities rather than problematic moral inconsistencies, as Wong seems to think.